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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-LIMITS ON INVESTIGATIVE POWER 
OF STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES-Defendant appeared before the New 
Hampshire attorney general, who was authorized by statute1 to investigate 
violations of the state subversive activities law2 and to determine if sub-
versive persons, as defined therein, were present within the state. Defendant 
refused to answer certain questions about the contents of a university class 
lecture delivered by him and about his knowledge of other persons' activi-
ties in the Progressive Party, contending that such questions infringed 
an area protected by the First Amendment.8 The state superior court con-
ceded the infringement of defendant's rights, but found this to be justified 
by state interest in self-protection, and convicted defendant for contempt.-i 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.5 On certiorari to the United 
1 N.H. Laws (1953) c. 307. Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A. (2d) 756 (1954), 
construed the statute to constitute him a one-man legislative committee for purpose of 
the authorized investigation. 
2 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) c. 588, §§1 to 16. 
3 The Court, without discussion, treated this as invoking the protection of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4Pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) c. 491, §§19 and 20 
5 Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 121 A. (2d) 783 (1956). 
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States Supreme Court, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The investiga-
tion invaded defendant's rights of academic freedom and political expression 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because 
of the breadth of the resolution authorizing the investigation, no state in-
terest was validly expressed, thus obviating any balancing of state and 
individual interests. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected against state abridg-
ment by the Fourteenth Amendment6 and against federal abridgment by 
the First Amendment.7 Witnesses before congressional committees have 
attempted to invoke the First Amendment as a limitation on the power 
of such committees to compel testimony,8 contending that the freedoms 
guaranteed therein include a right of silence. Lower federal courts have 
recognized existence of a right of silence, primarily as an aspect of free 
speech, where congressional committee inquiries were directed toward the 
identity of bulk purchasers of books,9 and the communist affiliations of an 
individual.10 The Supreme Court, however, did not squarely rule on the 
question until the recent decision in Watkins v. United States.11 The ma-
jority there recognized a First Amendment right of silence before a con-
gressional committee. In neither Watkins nor the principal case, however, 
did the Court consider whether there is a negative freedom of remaining 
silent which is constitutionally protected. The right of silence recognized 
was put positively: an individual ·should be permitted to remain silent rath-
er than be exposed or harassed because he had previously exercised the First 
Amendment freedoms of political and academic expression. The Court 
in Watkins indicated that this right was not absolute, but that it must be 
balanced against public need for the testimony, in order to determine if 
disclosure can be constitutiona:Ily compelled.12 It did not attempt to define 
the areas of information to which this right applies or to state criteria for 
6 Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 
U.S. 359 (1931). 
7 U.S. CoNsr., Amend. I. 
8 E.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 
155 (1955). For a general discussion see 22 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 741 (1954). 
9 Rumely v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 166, affd. on other grounds 
345 U.S. 41 (1953). 
10 Lawson v. United States, Trumbo v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 
49, cert. den. 339 U.S. 934 (1950), reh. den. 339 U.S. 972 (1950), where the right was held 
to be outweighed by the national interest. See also National Maritime Union of America 
v. Herzog, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 146, affd. on other grounds 334 U.S. 854 (1948); 
but see United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 
(1948), reh. den. 333 U.S. 858 (1948), motion for leave to file second petition for rehear-
ing denied 335 U.S. 899 (1948). 
11354 U.S. 178 (1957), commented on, p. 272 supra. The existence of a First Amend• 
ment limitation on congressional investigating power was recognized in dicta in United 
States v. Rumely, note 8 supra. In a related area a right to freedom from state compulsion 
to render a flag salute was expressly recognized in West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
12 This is consistent with earlier holdings on the limitations of. the freedom; e.g., 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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determining what public need will justify compelling testimony. The Court 
indicated that, where compulsion of testimony infringes First Amendment 
liberties, it will not recognize the existence of any legislative need as a 
possible justification unless the authorizing resolution is so carefully drawn 
that pertinent questions asked by the committee can clearly be seen as 
important to the legislative purpose expressed therein. 
On the basis of the Watkins case, the fundamental rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment against state abridgment might be expected 
to include a right of silence, and the instant case crystallizes this proposi-
tion. The principal opinion found it unnecessary to balance state interest 
against infringement of defendant's rights because it treated the broad 
grant of authority to the attorney general as an absence of legislative au-
thorization to ask the questions to which defendant objected.13 It appears 
probable that, applying the reasoning of the Watkins case, the Court felt 
the state's authorizing resolution to be so broad that the importance of 
these questions to the legislative purpose in authorizing the investigation 
was unclear. It seems likely that this, rather than lack of legislative au-
thorization of the attorney general to conduct the investigation, was the 
test applied to determine if the state legislature had expressed its opinion 
that there was a state interest in obtaining answers to these questions.14 
The result is that the authority of a state investigating committee must now 
be carefully defined by the legislature so that questions asked by the com-
mittee can be clearly related to the legislative purpose. This seems neces-
sary before the Court will recognize the existence of a state interest which 
may be balanced against possible infringement of First Amendment free-
doms to determine if such infringement is justified.15 The state interests, 
if any, which will justify invasion of these freedoms, thereby destroying 
the right of silence before legislative committees, were undefined.16 Also 
1s The concurring justices felt there was state authorization for the questions, but 
they held that, upon the facts, the defendant's right to political privacy and his right 
to academic freedom outweighed the state's interest in self-protection. 
H The state supreme court had found the attorney general to be acting within 
the scope of his authority as a legislative committee. Wyman v. Sweezy, note 5 supra. 
Thus the analysis suggested is consistent with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), 114 AL.R. 1487 at 1500 (1938), where it was held that a state court determination 
of a question of state law is generally conclusive in the federal courts. The Court in the 
instant case also stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require separation of 
powers at the state level. Accord, Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902); but cf. Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
15 The Court has often before expressed a particular solicitude for First Amendment 
liberties in their own right and as fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 
(1940). 
16 It was suggested in Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. 
den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948), reh. den. 339 U.S. 971 (1950), that the danger to the national 
interest sufficient to warrant compulsion of testimony in a congressional inquiry need 
be less than ,that required to justify legislation limiting freedom of speech. This may 
provide some guidance to the states, though it has analogical value only, since sedition 
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undefined were the areas of expression protected by the individual's right 
of silence. Nor did the Court attempt to suggest what factors will ultimately 
control in balancing the interest of the state against the constitutional 
rights of the witness. The instant case and the Watkins case, however, in-
dicate that in considering the constitutionality of a particular inquiry the 
Court may consider not only the effect upon the individual witness but 
the broader and more subtle influence which compulsion of testimony may 
have in suppressing expression by others. The present case only advises 
witnesses in a general way of the analysis which the Court will employ to 
determine the limits of their constitutional rights to remain silent before 
state legislative committees. Thus. the right of the state to compel testimony 
and the right of the witness to refuse to give testimony remain highly un-
certain until given further judicial definition. 
George E. Lohr 
against the national government is an area ·which Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 
(1956), held to be pre-empted by Congress. 
